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EU Policy Responses to a Shifting Multilateral System is a current issue. This book 
– edited by three Professors of International Relations at IBEI (Institut Barcelona 
d’Estudis Internacionals): Esther Barbé, Oriol Costa and Robert Kissack – is 
definitely useful to understand topical trends in international politics, such as the 
intensification of contradictions between the transnational and the national or between 
the economy and the political. The question is refreshing; the Spanish, or rather the 
Catalonian view, is probably helping with this. They ask: “How can the European 
Union (EU) survive the rise of the Rest?”– echoing the question of Fareed Zakaria1 
in the case of the United States (US). Given the progressive repolarisation of the 
international system – with the continuous political assertion of emerged countries 
such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – how will the 
EU, a major actor of the Western hegemonic bloc, react? The answer is explicit: 
either the EU endorses the shifting of the international system and acts accordingly: 
it accommodates; and/or it rejects the structural evolution and excludes diverging 
voices: it entrenches. The focus of the question is stimulating: for once, European 
integration does not influence the international; on the contrary: it is conditioned 
by it or rather it is “provincialized” as anti-colonial thinker Dipesh Chakrabarty 
likes to express it. This non-Eurocentric perspective brought by non-Anglo-Saxon 
researchers is very welcomed. 
The specific approach taken by the authors is actually the main contribution of 
the book within the literature on European foreign policy. This generally focuses 
on the complexity of the decision-making process inside member states and EU 
institutions with a liberal institutionalist perspective at the micro-level. Usually, the 
“black box” is opened, without questioning the effect. This book, on the contrary, 
legitimately raises the question of the effect, the effect of the macro – international 
structures – on the micro – foreign policy decisions –, of the external on the internal.
Drawing from Robert Cox’s Gramscian critical theory,2 the explanatory variable 
– the international structure - is understood as a combination of three factors: power, 
1  Fareed Zakaria, ‘The future of American power – How America can survive the rise of the rest’, Foreign 
affairs, Vol. 87, No. 18 (2008). 
2  Robert W. Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory’, Millenium : 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981). 
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ideas and institutions. This multi-causal analysis brings back temporality to foreign 
policy analysis: international structures can vary across time – from hegemony 
(congruence between ideas, institutions and power) to dysfunctional structure 
(misalignment between the three factors). The main hypothesis is the following: 
depending on the type of structure, the EU will react differently. In this sense, there 
is a proposition of articulation between agency and structures. This theoretical 
framework is presented in the introduction written by the editors of the book. 
There are eight case studies, all bring new empirical data: nuclear regimes 
(Benjamin Kienzle), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (Anna Herranz-Surrallés), the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) (Gemma Collantes-Celador), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (Patricia Garcia-Duran, Montserras Mllet and Jan Orbie), 
climate negotiations (Oriol Costa), United Nations Security Council debates on 
gender (Esther Barbé), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Robert Kissack) and 
child labour (Jean Grugel). The last thematic chapter (Natalia Chaban and Michèle 
Knodt) is different from the other parts as it deals with the perception that Southern 
elites - from Brazil, India and China – have developed while seeing the EU acting as 
a global energy governance actor.
From the case studies, some general conclusions can be drawn. But the authors 
are clear: the ambition of the book is not explanatory but exploratory. It aims at 
understanding the implications and motives of each option, rather than systematising. 
The comparison of case studies reveals first that the EU tends to act pragmatically 
and accept the inclusion of other players in the multilateral game (nuclear case, ICC 
and IMF) whereas the opposite reaction of protective entrenchment is not common 
(gender and ECT). It is worth noting that in 2008, the EU decided to reject the 
inclusion of other states in trade negotiations, which was not the case before the 
crisis. Second, there is a systematic normative entrenchment in some cases (nuclear 
arms, Child labour, the IMF, the ICC) of the EU except on climate change. Finally, 
the EU equally accommodates (nuclear case) and entrenches (ECT) regarding the 
demand of new institutions.
Drawing from these results, the first conclusion allows us to deconstruct the 
myth of the natural inclination toward entrenchment: in half of the cases, the EU 
accommodates. This supranational entity is not impassive vis-à-vis the changing 
structure of the international context, even if its decision-making process is complex. 
This accommodation does not come automatically from a static identity but from 
substantive goals, even if the EU frequently frames adaptation in terms of its 
commitment to multilateral practices. It means that the EU is not naturally inclined 
to save multilateralism if some interests are at stake. In the other half of the cases, the 
EU entrenches for two reasons: when its internal equilibrium is threatened or when 
accommodation is not a positive sum game. More generally, it is clear that the authors 
adopt an interpretative approach, leaving the “why” question for deeper research. 
However, these first results confirm their intuition on the limitation of nomothetic 
explanations, such as the liberal theory of identity. Nuancing Ian Manners’3 
“normative power Europe”, Richard Young’s4 “European liberal internationalism” 
3  Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms ?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
40, No. 2 (2002). 
4  Richard Youngs, The EU’s role in the world politics: A retreat from liberal internationalism (London: Routledge, 
2010). 
Marlène Rosano-Grange Review of ‘EU Policy Responses to a Shifting Multilateral System’ 97
and Knud Erik Jørgensen’s 5 “multilateral power”, the authors of the book remind us 
that identity is a social construction that can be manipulated when the opportunity 
arises.  
The conclusion written by Knud Erik Jørgensen aims at enriching the theoretical 
framework. First, he suggests that negative reactions of the EU, such as silences 
or exits, should be included in the model, along with the positive reactions of 
accommodation and entrenchment. I add that among the EU responses to a shifting 
multilateral system, non-institutional reactions – EU wars – could be integrated in 
the case studies, because, contrary to neoconservative thoughts, the EU is not only 
Venus – soft power – but also Mars – hard power6. Since the end of the Cold War 
and the numerous US wars, particularly the 2003 Iraq war, European member states 
have tried to build a common foreign and defence policy partially independent from 
NATO. The absence of this consideration denotes another shortfall in the analysis. 
Even if the authors are cautious about reifications of EU identity, they implicitly 
acknowledge an ideational difference between the political avowals of Russia and of 
the EU. However, the opposition is not a given and needs to be elucidated. 
Another criticism formulated by Jørgensen derives from the distinction that is 
made between the external as structural and the internal as intentional. Both external 
and internal are structural and intentional. The challenge is to theorise both. In this 
sense, the conclusion is not explicit. The author also calls to take into account more 
domestic factors such as internal politics, the weight of civil society and particularly 
NGOs etc. However, one can easily question the legitimacy of the “forgotten factor” 
criticism. The theory that is proposed in the book explicitly addresses this issue, 
by showing that external factors shape the domestic and, in doing so, establishes a 
hierarchy between factors. The theoretical power of a theory does not come from 
an “all-inclusive package” of factors that would make it un-falsifiable following 
Karl Popper’s idea of science. The other criticism made by Jørgensen regarding the 
subsuming power of ideas does not work either: the authors of the book show explicitly 
the limitation of the “identity” theory. More globally, it seems that the contributors to 
the book have different theoretical backgrounds, even if the introduction is based on 
the work of critical political economist Robert Cox. The latter uses Gramsci’s ideas on 
civil society at the international level. For Gramsci, the economic sphere determines 
the social and political spheres in “the last instance”. If Jørgensen and others do not 
share this basic assumption, another conceptual framework should have been used. 
The concept of “structural power” as defined by Susan Strange7 might have been a 
better option because according to her, there is no hierarchy between the factors of 
security, production, finance and knowledge. Finally, Justin Rosenberg’s uneven and 
combined development8 can be useful in order to articulate structures and agency. 
He shows that the international system is structured by differences of development 
inside and among societies. Interactions between societies do not reproduce the same 
social forms: political and economic development is combined. Agency resides in 
5  Knud E. Jørgensen, ‘Does Europe have foreign policy traditions?’ in F. Bynander and S. Guzzini (eds.), 
Rethinking foreign policy (London: Routledge, 2013). 
6 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London : Atlantic, 2004). 
7 Susan Strange, States and markets (New York: Bloomsbury, 1988). 
8  Justin Rosenberg ‘Why is There No International Historical Sociology’, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006). 
European Review of International Studies, Volume 5/201898
the choices that elites can make to adapt to international pressures. In this sense, 
reproduction of societies is also international.  
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